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Abstract 
 
In this work we use a proven model to study a dynamic duopolistic competition between an old and 
a new technology which, through improved technical performance – e.g. data transmission capacity 
– fight in order to conquer market share. The process whereby an old technology fights a new one 
off through own improvements has been named ‘sailing-ship effect’. In the simulations proposed, 
intentional improvements of both the old and the new technology are affected by the values of three 
key parameters: one scientific-technological, one purely technological and the third purely 
economic. The interaction between these components gives rise to different outcomes in terms of 
prevalence of one technology over the other. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of technology and its progress hardly needs to be emphasised, as it affects the daily 
life of us all. Within technology many dimensions – scientific, economic, political, juridical and 
‘pure’ technological – interact and feed each other. A systematic fundamental interaction, though, is 
that between technology and the economy. Economic variables such as the rate of interest on capital 
needed for new investments or the willingness to reduce costs to face competition are fundamental.  
Economists have been interested in defining and measuring technical change and innovation since a 
long time, and three fruitful schools of thought, which are concerned with technical change, are the 
Classical, Neo-Classical and Evolutionary ones. Each school is characterised by some basic 
assumptions – a paradigmatic nucleus – and a set of tools. Each approach has become heavily 
mathematicised, making use of the most advanced mathematical and statistical techniques, ranging 
from the mathematics of chaos to the various generations of (G)ARCH models. The main point 
about technical change and innovation is that they are intrinsically dynamic phenomena (Walrave 
and  Raven, 2016), so that the technical tools with which we analyse them must be adequate to the 
treatment of a dynamics which, often, is also non-linear and stochastic (Valenti et al., 2018).  
Innovation is a particularly strong phenomenon in capitalist economies in which firms, hunting for 
profit, look for better ways of doing things, be it a product, process, or organisational innovation. 
Worthy of a comment here is the work of the social scientist Joseph A. Schumpeter (1911, 1950) 
who, through his emphasis on innovation in capitalistic economies – innovation being sought for 
the profit sake –, opened a new research path which from the early 1980s is addressed as 
evolutionary economics. Economic evolution takes place through a process of “creative 
destruction”, of which innovation is the prime mover. The stress on innovation lies in that the 
innovative firm will often be for some time a monopolist, that is it will harvest monopolistic profits, 
i.e. profit margins unthinkable in competitive environments. Monopolistic profits, though, are 
transitory because of – among other things – imitation of other firms or the discovery by a new firm 
of yet another better way of doing the same thing(s).  
An important phenomenon which is sometimes observed within our economies is the technological 
competition which develops between an incumbent (‘old’) technology and a new emerging 
technology aimed at providing similar services. The phenomenon according to which an old 
technology is intentionally improved as a consequence of the emergence of a new, potentially 
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superior one, takes the name ‘sailing-ship effect’ (De Liso and Filatrella, 2008; Adner and Snow, 
2010; Sick et al., 2016). This phrase synthesises the accelerated improvements experienced by old 
sail-ships as new steam-ships began to appear in the 1820s. Examples thus range from sail vs. steam 
in ships’ construction (Gilfillan, 1935) to cables-cum-modems vs. fiber optics in data transmission 
(GTS, 2019). Furthermore, as a further collateral instance, in the pharmaceutical sector scientific 
investigation and technological development are normal when drugs, diagnostic or medical 
procedures are already adopted (Gagliardi et al., 2018). The question of market forecasting is 
tightly connected to the performances of the technologies – for instance to foresee the most 
effective technology in curbing greenhouse gases (Berggren et al., 2009), where the uncertainty in 
the outcome of the R&D has led to a complex structure of alliances and competition (Borgstedt et 
al., 2016). 
Technological and economic considerations affect the process of innovation according to the 
sailing-ship principle.  
In the first formalisation of the phenomenon (De Liso and Filatrella, 2008) the authors consider a 
dynamic duopolistic model in terms of a nonlinear functional map. In this model, which takes as the 
starting point the fundamental economic principle of profit maximisation, the old and the new 
technology are improved on the basis of the resources devoted to R&D, the efficiency according to 
which those resources are transformed into improved performance and the role played by the 
interest rate. The process of improvement of a technology is limited by the highest performance that 
can be reached by the technology itself: this is a physical limit, which usually sees the new 
technology being characterised by a higher potential. In the 2008 paper – as well as in a refined one 
in which a further ‘memory effect’ favouring the old technology is considered (De Liso and 
Filatrella, 2011) – the authors are content with showing the presence of the sailing-ship effect 
providing just one set of parameters.  
It is however interesting to study – and this is what we do in this paper – what happens in the 
original model when different values of three key parameters, namely the efficiency in converting 
R&D into improved performance, the highest possible technical performance of both technologies 
and the interest rate, are systematically varied. The reason to focus on these parameters lies in that 
the first is scientific-technological in kind, the second is purely technological, while the third is 
eminently economic. Furthermore, when introducing the original model, we will make explicit 
some mathematical aspects which were not made explicit in the original model itself. 
The work is structured as follows. In section 2 we recall some methodological aspects which 
connect physics with economics, and the application of these methods to a peculiar form of 
technical change. In section 3 we provide a résumé of the first formal model concerned with the 
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‘sailing-ship effect’. In section 4 we use that model to study the performance of the two 
technologies when the key parameters take different values. In section 5 the conclusions are drawn.  
 
2. An ‘econophysics’ approach to technical change  
Many research fields share the aim of predicting the motion of their subject matter – be it the 
position of planets, the weather or financial markets – and mathematics and statistics are often 
powerful tools which actually allow one to predict the evolution of certain phenomena. Often the 
same methods are used in different areas on the basis of analogies which are supposed to justify this 
use.  
Through analogies one can find new and different ways to use existing tools such as mathematics. 
Oppenheimer writes that analogy is an indispensable and inevitable tool for scientific progress, 
clarifying that by ‘analogy’ he means: 
“a special kind of similarity, which is the similarity of structure, the similarity of form, a similarity 
of constellation between two sets of structures, two sets of particulars, that are manifestly very 
different but have structural parallels. It has to do with relation and interconnection.” 
(Oppenheimer, 1956, p. 129) 
In the economics discipline, starting with the Marginalist-Neoclassical revolution of the 1870s, and 
in particular with the works of Jevons (1871) and Walras (1874), economists found more and more 
analogies with physics, taking from physics itself ideas and the mathematical method. In fact, the 
central idea of equilibrium in economics was taken from physics (Mirowski, 1989, pp. 238-241).  
In 1862 Jevons gave a speech entitled “A brief account of a general mathematical theory of political 
economy” at the Section F of the British Association, and Walras made clear in many occasions that 
he wanted to transform political economy into a hard science – the change of name of the discipline 
in the late 1870s from political economy into economics is not a simple coincidence. Walras’ 1909 
article Économique et mécanique synthesises the point. Irving Fisher, an important American 
contributor to Neoclassical theory, devoted the third chapter of his doctoral thesis – mathematical 
investigations in the theory of value and prices – to “mechanical analogies”, providing a table of 
correspondences between mechanics and economics, so that a ‘particle’ in mechanics corresponds 
to an ‘individual’ in economics, ‘energy’ to ‘utility’ and so on (Fisher, 1892, pp. 85-86). Worthy of 
a comment is the fact that Fisher’s thesis was reprinted in book form twice, in 1925 and 1926. Thus, 
inexorably, economics became a mathematical discipline, and as a rule, economists had – and, even 
more today, have – to be trained in mathematics and statistics.  
More improvements on the use of mathematical tools and simulations within economics come from 
the evolutionary school of thought, within which complexity is structurally acknowledged and 
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studied. A symbolic passage is the publication of the book An evolutionary theory of economic 
change (Nelson and Winter, 1982) in which, incidentally, the Schumpeterian model is thoroughly 
discussed (see pp. 289-301 therein).   
Paraphrasing the Nobel-prize winner for economics Gérard Debreu, one can say that theoretical 
physics was the ideal toward which economic theory strove (Debreu, 1991) and it is somehow 
surprising that the noun ‘econophysics’ appeared as late as in the second half of the1990s, and 
applied only to finance (De Liso and Filatrella, 2002).  
Innovation and technical change have been subjected to mathematical analysis, and different 
concepts, methods and tools have been elaborated. In particular, improvements in mathematical 
techniques, computation facilities and data availability have made it somehow easier to handle 
dynamic phenomena.  
One peculiar form of technical change is that which has been defined ‘sailing-ship effect’, that is, 
the process whereby an old technology is improved as a new one, competing with it and potentially 
supplanting it, appears.  
The process is represented graphically in Figure 1 hereafter. The picture is clear and simple, but the 
way to obtain it requires the econophysics toolbox in terms of use of a nonlinear functional map in 
which the Fermi-Dirac function has been adapted to model some economic effects – we shall 
illustrate the whole process in the next sections.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 1: Qualitative behaviour of the competition between two technologies that illustrates the 
sailing ship effect. 
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Here we visualise the meaning of the phrase ‘sailing-ship effect’. On the vertical axis one reads the 
performance of the technology – e.g. in terms of freight capacity or data transmission in MBps –, 
while on the horizontal axis we have time. In panel (a) of the figure the ‘sailing-ship effect’ is 
illustrated. The solid line represents the old technology, the dashed line the new technology. As the 
new technology appears as a niche technology with a tiny market share (Coles et al., 2018) at time 0 
the – by now – old technology gets improved. Had the old technology not been improved, the 
overtaking of the new would have taken place at time t1 at a performance level 0.1. Through the 
sailing-ship effect, overtaking of the new over the old technology takes place later in time, at t2, and 
at a higher performance level. The old technology gets a new lease of life and the overall 
technological performance is improved. In panel (b) we see the asymptotic performance of both 
technologies. It is important to underline that in this model the performances’ dynamics are not 
given by an assumed exogenous growth ratio as, for instance, in Cantner and Vannuccini (2017).  
 
3. The initial model capable of reproducing the ‘sailing-ship effect’ 
As we mentioned in the introductory section, the starting point of this paper is the model originally 
proposed in De Liso and Filatrella (2008), and it is necessary here to provide a résumé of that model 
in order to grasp the analysis proposed in section four. However, while providing this résumé we 
will also provide, in sub-section 3.2, further explicit passages which allow for a deeper 
understanding of the original model.  
 
3.1 The original model 
The context is that of a dynamic duopoly race between two firms which produce a certain good or 
provide a certain service (e.g. data transmission) characterised by a performance level P (for the 
sake of simplicity hereafter we will always write ‘product’); the higher the performance, the more 
consumers are attracted by that product. Firms’ objective consists in profit maximization as 
indicated by eq. (1). The incumbent firm uses a certain ‘old’ technology A, while the new entrant 
firm uses a ‘new’ technology B (the words ‘firm’ and ‘technology’ will be used as synonyms, that is 
we will speak of ‘firm A’ or ‘technology A’ indifferently, and analogously for firm / technology B). 
As there often occurs, at the beginning the new technology is rather unwieldly and unreliable, so 
that its initial performance is inferior to the old one, but characterised by a higher performance 
potential (e.g. cables-cum-modem vs. fiber optics in data transmission). The emergence of the new 
technology is a threat for the incumbent, so that the latter begins to look for ways – even in 
unorthodox ways (Schiavone 2013, 2014) – to improve its performance to try to keep the entrant at 
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bay. Both technologies, though, are improved by allocating resources to R&D. Market share 
depends on the technical performance. The simulations are based on the following equations.  
At time t+1 the profits  of firm A (B) are given by: 
𝜋(𝑡 + 1) = (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑞(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡)(1 + 𝑟)      (1) 
where p is the price of the product sold in the market; c is the cost of production; q(t) is the quantity 
of product sold; R the resources devoted to R&D in order to improve the performances of the 
product/technology; r is the rate of interest.  
The latter parameter, r, is important in that it ‘weights’ the resources spent on R&D. In fact, if the 
firm must borrow money from banks to carry out R&D, it must pay an interest on that money, 
which thus increases the costs of R&D itself1. Money lenders may behave differently, according to 
the risk which they attach to different customer-firms. When firms ask for loans, banks may apply a 
lower interest rate to a firm with which they have long-lasting relationship, or may consider the old 
technology less risky to improve; should this be the case we would have rA < rB. In figure 4 and 5 of 
section four we will consider the different possibilities concerning the rate of interest as applied to 
the two firms. 
If there is only one monopolistic firm in the market R equals zero (there is no need to spend money 
to improve the product, the performance of which remains thus constant), so that q corresponds at 
first to the total market Q.  
When the new firm / technology emerges, we will have a market share for A and B, i.e. SA= qA/Q 
and, analogously, SB = qB/Q. Consumers choose the product on the basis of its performance so that 
when the two technologies have the same technical performance, market share will be equally 
divided at 50% for each firm. Price and cost are constant, so that competition concerns performance 
of the technology, that is R&D is performance-enhancing rather than cost-reducing.  
Performance, P, of the technology improves according to the following equation: 
𝑃(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑅(𝑡)𝛾 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−  
𝑃𝑀
𝑃𝑀−𝑃(𝑡)
)       (2) 
In eq. (2) we know, from the previous comments, that R are the resourced devoted to R&D, and we 
must explain  and the exponential function. The former is a parameter which converts R&D 
expenditure into improved performance, while the latter is a function capable of limiting the 
efficiency of R&D expenditure when performances approach the limit value PM. The latter comment 
refers to the fact that the closer a technology gets to its achievable maximum performance, the more 
it is difficult to improve it: that is, equal amounts of resources devoted to R&D generate smaller and 
smaller performance improvements.  
                                                 
1 Should the firms carry out R&D with their own resources, they would miss the interest rate that they would have 
received, had those same resources been invested in financial assets. 
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In detail, eq. (2) works as follows. For P(t)<<PM, the exponential reads e-1, and therefore each 
money unit is converted into /e ≈ 0.37improvement of performances. As performances increase, it 
is convenient to Taylor-expand eq. (2): 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−  
𝑃𝑀
𝑃𝑀−𝑃(𝑡)
) = ∑
1
𝑘!
[
−𝑃𝑀
𝑃𝑀−𝑃
]
𝑘
∞
𝑘=0 =
1
𝑒
[1 −
𝑃
1−𝑃𝑀 𝑒⁄
−⋯]    (3) 
Therefore, for small values of the performances P the function decreases linearly, to mimic the 
decreasing returns of R&D investments. As P approaches the limit value PM the function (2) 
exponentially decreases to 0, that is any investment in R&D results in a negligible increase of the 
performances.  
The competition process is based on profit maximization of both firms. Profit depends on the 
market share S which, in turn, depends on one’s own performance but also on the performance of 
the other technology – that is SA(t) = fA (PA(t), PB(t)) and SB(t) = fB (PB(t), PA(t)) – while one’s 
performance improves according to the resources devoted to R&D, and is limited by the highest 
limit set by some physical law.  
Functions fA and fB have the following properties, as dictated by economic reasoning: a) they have 
the same functional shape (no a priori preference for one technology or the other); b) they only 
depend upon the ratio between the performances (users perceive only the relative strengths of the 
two technologies); c) the functional form is a sigmoid as observed in many empirical studies on 
technology adoption.  
To keep the model as manageable as possible, the abovementioned properties can be modelled by 
the formula: 
𝑆𝐴/𝐵(𝑡) = 𝑓𝐴/𝐵(𝑡) = [
𝑃𝐴/𝐵(𝑡)
𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡)
]
1
𝛼
−1
(
1
2
)
2−
1
𝛼
 .           (4) 
 
Eq. (4) satisfies the ‘natural’ requirement according to which the share must be 1/2, or 50%, when 
the performances of the two technologies are identical. The parameter  – which must be 0 < < 1 
– describes the sensitivity of the consumer to the quality of the product: the higher the value, the 
more the consumer is indifferent, or incapable to discern, the quality of the two technologies. In the 
limit 𝛼 → 0 the share approaches the step function  𝜗 [
2𝑃𝐴/𝐵(𝑡)
𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡)
] (the best performance gets all), 
and for =1 the share reads SA/B =1/2 (market is divided in half independently of the products’ 
relative quality). For simplicity we consider here the intermediate case , for which 𝑆𝐴/𝐵(𝑡) =
[
𝑃𝐴/𝐵(𝑡)
𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡)
] 
The equations that are simulated in the next section are thus:  
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𝑃𝐴(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑃𝐴(𝑡) +
1
2
(𝑃𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐵(𝑡)) × [1 − (1 + 𝑟𝐴)
(𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡))
2
𝑃𝐵(𝑡)(𝑝−𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐴
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐴
𝑀
𝑃𝐴
𝑀−𝑃𝐴(𝑡)
)] ×
                                                                         × 𝜗 [1 − (1 + 𝑟𝐴)
(𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡))
2
𝑃𝐵(𝑡)(𝑝−𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐴
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐴
𝑀
𝑃𝐴
𝑀−𝑃𝐴(𝑡)
)]     (5a) 
 
𝑃𝐵(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑃𝐵(𝑡) +
1
2
(𝑃𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐵(𝑡)) × [1 − (1 + 𝑟𝐵)
(𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡))
2
𝑃𝐴(𝑡)(𝑝−𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐵
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐵
𝑀
𝑃𝐵
𝑀−𝑃𝐵(𝑡)
)] ×
                                                                         × 𝜗 [1 − (1 + 𝑟𝐵)
(𝑃𝐴(𝑡)+𝑃𝐵(𝑡))
2
𝑃𝐴(𝑡)(𝑝−𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐵
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐵
𝑀
𝑃𝐵
𝑀−𝑃𝐵(𝑡)
)]     (5b) 
 
Let us remind that in the above equations p is the unitary selling price of the product – not to be 
confused with performance P –, c the production cost of a unit, and Q the total market; thus Q(p-c) 
is the market value at stake in the competition that is considered to be constant. Should one 
technology – usually the new one – become much better than the other after some iterations, that 
technology could corner the market, i.e. virtually all users would adopt it. 
The only component which remains to be explained in eq.s (5a) and (5b) is the 𝜗 function. This is a 
step function, and is needed because of economic logic. The battle between the two technologies is 
bound to have an end: in the long run, performance improvements become more and more difficult 
and more costly, so that further expenditure on R&D is not (more than) offset by higher receipts. 
Thus, when the argument within the last brackets turns negative, R&D expenditure must fall to zero 
– and this is what the 𝜗 function does.   
 
3.2 Analytical considerations and some more clarifications on the working of the model 
Most of the information that can be retrieved from the model stems from simulations – as 
anticipated in Fig. 1 – and the two-dimensional nonlinear map (5a) and (5b) is sufficiently simple to 
allow for some analytical considerations. However, we need to elaborate the original model in order 
to make explicit some passages which were left unspoken there. First of all, it is convenient to 
rewrite eq.s (5a,b) as a formal two-dimensional map:  
 
{
𝑃𝐴(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐺𝐴(𝑃𝐴(𝑡), 𝑃𝐵(𝑡); 𝑃𝐴
𝑀 , 𝑟𝐴, 𝛾𝐴, (𝑝 − 𝑐), 𝑄)
𝑃𝐵(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐺𝐵(𝑃𝐴(𝑡), 𝑃𝐵(𝑡); 𝑃𝐵
𝑀 , 𝑟𝐵, 𝛾𝐵, (𝑝 − 𝑐), 𝑄)
                                                        
(6𝑎)
(6𝑏)
 
 
Then we can identify the asymptotic solution, i.e. the fixed point. In fact, when iterations do not 
lead to any further change, the fixed point, that is PA/B (t+1) = PA/B (t) = PA/B
*, reads: 
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{
 
 
 
 𝑃𝐵
∗ = (1 + 𝑟𝐴)
(𝑃𝐴
∗ + 𝑃𝐵
∗)2
(𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐴
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐴
𝑀
𝑃𝐴
𝑀 − 𝑃𝐴
∗)                                                                          (7𝑎)
𝑃𝐴
∗ = (1 + 𝑟𝐵)
(𝑃𝐴
∗ + 𝑃𝐵
∗)2
(𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐵
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐵
𝑀
𝑃𝐵
𝑀 − 𝑃𝐵
∗)                                                                           (7b) 
 
 
The fixed point of the map, that in economic terms represents the equilibrium point at which the 
two technologies do not improve any further, is only implicitly defined by the above equations. 
From the mathematical point of view the 𝜗 function seen above introduces a discontinuity that 
makes the map non-differentiable precisely in the fixed point, for the eigenvalues of the Jacobian 
that regulates the stability of the map in the fixed point (7a, 7b) are not defined:  
 
𝑑𝑒𝑡 (
𝜕𝐺𝐴(𝑃𝐴,𝑃𝐵)
𝜕𝑃𝐴
− 𝜆
𝜕𝐺𝐴(𝑃𝐴,𝑃𝐵)
𝜕𝑃𝐵
𝜕𝐺𝐵(𝑃𝐴,𝑃𝐵)
𝜕𝑃𝐴
𝜕𝐺𝐵(𝑃𝐴,𝑃𝐵)
𝜕𝑃𝐵
− 𝜆
)|
𝑃𝐴=𝑃𝐴
∗
𝑃𝐵=𝑃𝐵
∗
  (8) 
 
Thus, the stability of the fix point is to be established numerically. Another interesting property is 
the limit in which the technology A (or B) does not invest. This happens when the 𝜗 function 
argument is negative, that is, for instance for technology A: 
𝑃𝐴 ≤ (1 + 𝑟𝐵)
(𝑃𝐴+𝑃𝐵)
2
(𝑝−𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐵
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐵
𝑀
𝑃𝐵
𝑀−𝑃𝐵
)       (9a) 
 
Condition (9a) can be seen as the maximum value that can be reached by performances of the old 
technology. It is interesting to notice that performances are squared on the right hand side of the 
equation, while they are ‘only’ linear at the left hand side. Thus, for any assumed value of the 
performances B, eventually inequality (9a) holds true, and A’s expenditure in R&D ceases. An 
analogous expression can be found for technology B: 
 
𝑃𝐵 ≤ (1 + 𝑟𝐴)
(𝑃𝐴+𝑃𝐵)
2
(𝑝−𝑐)𝑄𝛾𝐴
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑃𝐴
𝑀
𝑃𝐴
𝑀−𝑃𝐴
) .       (9b) 
 
Eq. (9b) describes the maximum performances actually achieved by the new technology, B. For any 
value of A, this limit performance is below the maximum theoretical value PMB. Finally, the 
condition (9b) is clearly true for arbitrary small values of B’s performances. In economic terms, the 
new technology B invests, no matter how small are the initial performances – or how high are the 
performances of the old technology.  
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4. Simulations of the model  
How the parameters affect the race for technological primacy has been investigated through 
extended simulations of the model. The advantage of a quantitative model lies precisely in the 
possibility to compute the consequences of changes of external conditions (e.g. interest rate) or to 
evaluate the role of intrinsic features of the technologies (i.e. the maximum performance which can 
be reached by the technology and the efficiency in converting resources devoted to R&D into 
improved performance of that technology).  
In particular, we will study what happens when we deal with a changing ‘economic’ parameter, i.e. 
the interest rate r, on the one hand, and how ‘scientific’ and ‘technological’ parameters, i.e.  and 
PM, affect the competition process between the two technologies, on the other. Let us begin with the 
latter.  
 
4.1 ‘Scientific’ and ‘technological’ parameters 
In Figure 2 we compare what happens when we keep constant the old technology’s capability of 
converting R&D into improved performance, i.e. = 2.55, while we have different values of , the 
other parameters being PMB = 5, PMA = 1 (i.e. the new technology has a potential five times bigger 
than the old) and r =5% for both technologies.  
We plot the asymptotic value of the performances achieved by the old technology PA and the new 
technology PB. In the language of the nonlinear maps, we numerically retrieve the fixed points of 
eqs (7a and 7b). It is important to stress the fact that in the figure we do not plot the time evolution, 
but the limit value of either technology when is held constant while  takes different values. In 
the numerical simulations we have never encountered the case of an unstable fix point, e.g. 
encountering a bifurcation or a more complex orbit.  
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Figure 2: effect of the efficiency of the conversion of R&D investments on the asymptotic (final) 
performances of the two technologies. 
 
As one would expect, the larger the efficiency of the conversion of R&D into improved 
performance of the new technology the higher the asymptotic performance level. However, the 
efficiency term  seems to affect also the qualitative outcome: in fact, for low efficiency values, the 
old technology is capable to withstand the competition and to maintain the primacy in the long run 
– see grey line in Fig. 2. Only for values of B above 2 is the new technology actually capable to 
impose itself as the leading technology. Efficiency is also capable to affect the race in a subtler way: 
an increase in the efficiency of the new technology – and this is true up to B = 2 – stimulates 
improvements of the old technology, which thus achieves higher levels of (asymptotic) 
performance.  
For sake of simplicity we have shown here the dynamics of the performances. As the share, or  
penetration, of the product in our model is determined by the performances through the functions fA 
and fB – see Section 3.1 –, the dynamics of the performances translates into an evolution of the 
market shares that can be more directly related to the empirical data (see, for instance, Palacios-
Fenech and Tellis, 2016). 
The role played by the maximum performance of the new technology, PMB, is investigated in Figure 
3. As we said, the maximum performance of a technology is limited by a physical law. Setting the 
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parameters =  = 2.55, PMA = 1 and r =5% for both technologies, we study what happens when 
PMB can take different values.  
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of the maximum performance of the new technology on the asymptotic 
performances of the two technologies. 
 
First of all, as one would expect, the two technologies reach the same performance level when both 
technologies have the same potential. Then, as the potential of the new technology increases, the 
incumbent technology even experiences a diminution in its technical performance. Once more, let 
us point out that this is not the time evolution of the performance of either technology, but the 
behaviour of the performance of technology A when different values of the maximum performance 
of technology B are considered. Thus, values of PMB greater than 4 actually create a condition in 
which technology A’s performance deteriorates.  
 
4.2 The economic parameter 
An interesting aspect of the simulation is that which considers the role played by the economic 
parameter r, that is the interest rate. If firms borrow money from banks to carry out R&D, then we 
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are in the Schumpeter ‘Mark I’ condition2, so that, in fact, the ultimate decision-maker to affect the 
innovative process is the bank.  
A first simulation, whose results are illustrated in Figure 4, considers the situation in which both 
technologies are asked to repay the same interest rate. Setting  at the same value for both 
technologies (= 2.55) and the new technology five times potentially better than the old one (PMB 
= 5, PMA = 1) one can see that the higher the interest rate, the lower the performance level reached 
by both technologies. 
 
 
Figure 4: effect of the interest rate on the asymptotic performances of the two technologies; here 
the interest rate r applied to both firms / technologies is the same. 
 
When the interest rate is uniformly applied to both technologies, the new technology, characterised 
by a higher potential performance, always prevails.  
In Figure 5, instead, we see what happens when the old technology A borrows money for R&D at a 
constant interest rate rA, while technology’s B varies, the other parameters being =  = 2.55, PMA 
= 1 and PMB = 5. In panel (a) of the figure the interest rate for technology A is 10%. Obviously, the 
lower the interest rate for B, the higher its performance. Technology A and B have the same 
                                                 
2 Joseph Schumpeter writes that it is the banking system which makes innovation possible by risking the capital, 
defining the banker as the ephor of the exchange economy (1911, English translation 1961, p. 74). Despite the fact that 
big corporations very often do not depend on the banking system because they have their internal resources (this would 
be the ‘Schumpeter Mark II’ situation), new innovative start-ups actually do often depend on that banking system. The 
latter, by selecting which projects to finance, applying different interest rates, implicitly affects the innovative path.  
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technical performance when A pays 10% and B 30%, thus for rB< 30% B’s performance is higher 
than A’s.  
The competition process will experience the prevalence of one technology or the other according to 
the interplay between the value(s) taken by the interest rate on the one hand, and the potential 
maximum performances on the other. In particular, the higher the interest rate to borrow money, the 
less one will invest in R&D. Put it in another way, when the interest rate is excessively high, 
technology B stops the developments too early, and in spite of the fact that it is definitely better – 
potentially five times – than technology A, the actual performance which it reaches is much lower. 
Specifically, for the parameters of Fig. 5, should the interest rate for B be higher than 30%, 
technology B would remain inferior to technology A for lack of research. Instead, when investments 
are affordable, e.g. when firm A and B have the same interest rate of about 10%, B’s asymptotic 
performance is PB=0.203 while A’s is PA=0.173. 
In panel (b) of Figure 5, A pays a 5% interest rate, the other parameters being the same as in panel 
(a). First of all, one sees that a lower interest rate for technology A implies a better performance for 
A itself with respect to what happens in panel (a). In panel (b), technology B has the same 
performance as technology A when firm B gets a 25% interest rate. As soon as B pays an interest 
rate smaller than 25%, B itself overtakes A in terms of performance. Once more, this phenomenon is 
explained by the fact that the higher interest rate is offset, or more than offset, by a much higher 
maximum potential performance, which makes it easier to transform resources devoted to R&D into 
improved performance. When the two firms are charged the same interest rate, i.e. 5% in this case, 
A’s performance is 0.179, while B’s is 0.212. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5: Effect of differentiated interest rates for the two technologies. In panel (a) the established 
technology borrows money at the interest rate rA=10%, and in panel (b) at rA=5%. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Technology and technological change are at centre stage of our societies at least since the inception 
of the First Industrial Revolution. Within technology scientific, ‘pure’ technological and economic 
dimensions merge, so that when we want to study technological evolution, complexity is a 
structural feature which we have to face. 
In this work we have focused our attention of that form of technological change which is known as 
the ‘sailing-ship effect’, that is those improvements in an old technology which are intentionally 
sought as a new, potential supplanter, technology emerges.  
The dynamic duopolistic competition between the new and the old technology is studied through a 
nonlinear functional map, which provides a quantitative tool to examine the evolution of the 
performance of both technologies through time. The overall process is based on firms’ profit 
maximization; firms compete for market share, and the latter depends on technologies’ performance 
– i.e. the better the technical performance, the higher the market share. 
The outcome of this competition, though, depends on the three key parameters which have been 
considered, namely , PM and r. As we pointed out in section three, the first is scientific-
technological, the second is purely technological and the third is economic in kind.  
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Parameter synthesises the way in which resources devoted to R&D can be translated into higher 
performance of the technology. Obviously, the higher is , the higher the performance becomes, and 
it is interesting to see – as we did in Figure 2 – what happens when the old technology evolves 
according to a given value of A, while different values of B are considered.   
Parameter PM is the physical upper technical limit of the technology. As a rule, the new technology 
will be characterised by a higher potential with respect to the old, so that, given this premise, the 
new technology has always an advantage over the old. 
The interest rate r plays a key role, and the higher it is, the lower the performance of both 
technologies.  
What is interesting is the result of the system’s behaviour when different values of the three 
parameters are considered, and in particular the role played by r. In fact, as we emphasised, this is 
an economic parameter which heavily affects the overall system and it is a purely discretionary 
parameter, chosen by the banking system. The rate at which the bank makes money available to 
firms can make a big difference in terms of which technology succeeds, so that the bank becomes, 
in the end, a key agent in promoting or withholding the old or the new technology. 
The model here used can thus be useful for scenario studies in which an old and a new technology 
compete to conquer a market. The multidimensional parameters space can be thoroughly explored 
with extensive simulations, that can highlight how the technological and economic properties are 
quantitatively interwoven.  
The comments above open the way to policy issues. Firms – and governments – have to decide if 
and how much to invest to improve technologies, and the first decision that the owners / users of the 
old technology have to take is whether the battle with new technology is worth making. Decisions 
are largely based on scientific, technological and economic expectations concerning one’s own 
technology and the other. A complex picture emerges and, broadening for a moment the 
perspective, one should take into account that nowadays the financing of innovation is more and 
more characterised by the presence of venture capitalists and of the so-called ‘business angels’. 
Both latter categories may have a risk-neutral or even a risk-loving attitude, while banks tend to be 
risk-averse, so that those who deal with the former agents have an advantage over those who have 
to refer to the traditional banking system to finance their innovation efforts. 
In closing, let us hint at possible extensions of the model. In the first place, the present model 
describes competition between two firms (or technologies). One could try to explore a situation in 
which competition takes place between more than two technologies; a challenge would thus be to 
extend the exercise to the case in which more two agents exist, possibly making also use of game 
theory.  
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Secondly, when we deal with R&D, the transformation of resources devoted to R&D itself into 
improved performance may be affected by the presence of a stochastic, or ‘noisy’, component. With 
regards to the role of noise in a competition dynamics, inspiration could be found in the work by 
Giuffrida et al. (2009) or Valenti et al. (2016). One could for instance try to consider a stochastic 
component in the sailing-ship competition process – a component which would be strictly 
connected, e.g. in a multiplicative way, with the way in which our parameter  works. 
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